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Reproductive medicine and the concept of ‘quality’ 
 
Abstract 
Selection in reproductive medicine today relies on normative assessments of what ‘good life’ consists of. This paper 
explores the terms under which such assessments are made by focusing on three particular concepts of ‘quality’ – 
quality of life, biological quality and population quality. It is suggested that the apparently conflicting hypes, hopes and 
fears that surround reproductive medicine can co-circulate because of the different forms of normative assessment that 
these concepts allow. To ensure clarity in bioethical deliberations about selection, it is necessary to highlight how these 
differing forms of normative assessment are mobilised and invoked in practices of and debates about reproductive 
medicine. 
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Introduction 
 
Technological interventions into human reproduction are among the most bioethically controversial 
today. Whether such interventions aim to prevent, terminate, promote, enable or direct 
reproduction, justifications are subject to intense bioethical scrutiny, especially as pertains any 
vulnerabilities on the part of the individuals who are their targets [1,2]. Yet, at the same time, 
reproductive medicine represents hope for large numbers of couples who are unable to reproduce 
without assistance as well as for couples who are burdened by a fear of genetically transmitting a 
life of suffering to future offspring [3,4]. And finally, as reproductive medicine continues to expand 
from the treatment of infertility towards the steering of reproduction through genetic screening, 
counselling and selection, many suggest that dangerous hype about future possibilities emerges 
[5,6]. 
 
In the following, I will show how the concept of ‘quality’ can help us to situate these apparently 
conflicting hypes, hopes and fears. In particular, I will focus on three different concepts of ‘quality’ 
– quality of life, biological quality and population quality – as a way to show how differing forms 
of normative assessment of what ‘good life’ consists of are central to the controversies that 
surround reproductive medicine today. It is exactly in attempts to set the terms of this normativity 
that bioethical controversies arise: What is a ‘life worth living’? Is there such a thing as ‘good 
stock’ that should be collectively promoted? What is an embryo ‘worthy of implantation’? Which 
‘kinds of living’ are so poor that they should be prevented through termination of pregnancies? By 
exploring how the concept of ‘quality’ is mobilised in different ways in practices of and debates 
about reproductive medicine, I will show how developments in the reproductive field can at one and 
the same time generate eugenic fears, hopes to prevent or alleviate suffering, and, many would say, 
exaggerated expectations about a disease-free future. 
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‘Serious disease’ and quality of life 
 
Over the last decades, reproductive medicine has enlarged its remit to include preconception, 
preimplantation and prenatal screening of partners, embryos and foetuses in situations of so-called 
(potentially) ‘at risk’ pregnancies [3,6,7]. These forms of assisted reproduction, where selective 
rather than ‘merely’ facilitated reproduction (i.e. infertility treatment) is at stake, have been highly 
controversial from their beginnings, especially in light of an all-too-recent eugenic past. I will return 
to the bioethical controversies surrounding selection later. For now, what I want to highlight are the 
contested justifications that are most often given for these screening technologies. 
 
What links the genetic screening of couples, embryos and foetuses in reproductive medicine today 
is ‘serious disease’. This form of reproductive medicine aims to provide prospective parents with as 
much genetic information as possible about their partner (carrier screening), embryos 
(preimplantation genetic diagnosis) or foetus (prenatal screening) on the basis of which they then 
can make informed decisions about whether or not to begin or terminate a pregnancy. For some, any 
kind of genetic screening is unethical whatever the justifications, while for others, ethical dilemmas 
relate more to the question of what grounds are sufficient for terminating a pregnancy or selecting 
an embryo. And it is here that attempts to define what is meant by a ‘serious disease’ are contested. 
As pointed out in a recent report from the United Kingdom’s Human Genetics Commission, at the 
level of the family, what constitutes “serious” concerns on the one hand “conditions that are 
considered to lead to a very poor quality of life [for the future child]” and on the other “whether the 
family feels it could cope with the demands of a child with such problems” [12]. To find consensus 
on this – whether through public debate, legislative processes or institutionalised ethics 
commissions – is needless to say a great challenge: 
 
“quality of life judgements are subjective, and… genetic disorders are variable in terms of severity 
and health outcomes. There is evidence to suggest that people with genetic disorders, their families 
and professionals all have different views about which conditions give rise to a poor quality of 
life… For example, there is no agreement on whether being born with Down’s Syndrome is to be 
born with such a poor quality of life that it would be better not to have been born” [12]. 
 
Quality, in the senses invoked in these debates, concerns ‘quality of life’. It is not a corporal or bio-
physiological quality, rather it is a form of quality that is located in a subjective realm which is used 
to tell us something about the ways in which corporal life is experienced, negotiated, coped with 
and/or taken advantage of [13]. It concerns the ability of families to cope with bearing and rearing 
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children suffering from certain conditions as well as judgements about the quality of life a child 
would have living with certain debilitating diseases such as Tay-Sachs or Myotonic Dystrophy. The 
distinction between life and living is key, as in these deliberations, the normativity of what ‘good’ 
versus ‘poor’ quality of life is, relates to notions of a ‘life worth living’. 
 
So, for example, in the UK, the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFEA) requires 
that clinics applying for a licence to carry out preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) for a certain 
disease evaluate not only the “known risk” and “mode of inheritance” of the disease, but also the 
“severity of the particular case”, the “likely degree of suffering associated with the condition” as 
well as the “way it affects the family”. While not explicitly stated, the HFEA’s list of licensed PGD 
conditions reads as a list of ‘(potentially) poor kinds of living’ (for the potential sufferers and 
families involved) that have been judged by the authority to be apposite for selective prevention 
[10,11]. It is also these forms of reasoning that have given rise to a series of ‘wrongful life’ and 
‘wrongful birth’ lawsuits in the United States, where doctors have been charged by parents with 
either wrongfully allowing a life of pain and suffering to come into being, or wrongfully causing 
emotional pain and suffering for the parents as a result of negligent reproductive counselling. As 
Shelley Reuter has shown, in one such case, a mother suing her doctor testified that “[t]here is 
nothing on this earth that would have made me have a baby with Tay-Sachs Disease” [8]. And so 
the normative assessment of quality of life relies on judgments about the “likely degree of 
suffering” – whether on the part of prospective parents or the potential child – in particular cases. 
 
Assessing the quality of gametes and embryos 
 
Reproductive medicine, of course, relies on biological samples – blood, skin, hair, gametes, 
embryos, polar bodies, blastomeres, chorionic villi, amniotic fluid. It is these samples that will be 
manipulated and/or biopsied during the course of genetic testing and assisted reproduction. And 
when it comes to ensuring the best possible chances for success, it is the biological quality of these 
samples that is central to reproductive medicine. The development of ‘objective’ criteria with which 
to assess sperm, embryo and more recently oocyte quality has been a key part of advances in 
fertility treatment over the past decades. It is a predominantly visual form of assessment (aided by 
microscopes) where quality continuums work as vitality scales. 
 
The better the quality of a gamete or embryo, the more aesthetically ‘good-looking’ or vibrant it is. 
Sperm quality is measured and graded according to criteria of motility, density, morphology, 
fructose level as well as pH level. Judgements are made not only about the number of sperm in a 
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sample but also about whether observed sperm have ‘good forward movement’, an ‘oval form’ and 
‘smooth contours’. Embryos are also visually evaluated, in their case according to morphology, 
number of fragments as well as size of cells. Judgements are made about the ‘roundness’, ‘clarity’ 
and ‘symmetry’ of embryos after which they can be graded according to morphological scoring 
systems [14, 15]. In contrast, agreement on ‘reliable’ oocyte quality criteria has not come as far, 
although a number of embryologists are working on grading systems based on microscopy 
techniques [16]. 
 
Yet, better morphological quality is no guarantee for successful reproduction (although it does 
improve chances), nor does the morphologically-assessed quality of gametes and embryos tell you 
anything about the future offspring. This has become especially clear with the development of PGD 
techniques. As put by Sarah Franklin: “Some ‘top grade’ embryos, which are judged by their 
morphology to be the ‘best’ for selective reimplantation, may have invisible but lethal genetic or 
chromosomal defects that mean they are clinically useless—but no one can tell this ‘just by 
looking’” [17]. 
 
What this suggests is that the biological quality of gametes and embryos does not only concern the 
aesthetics of their morphology but also the conformity of their genetics. And since heredity is not 
something visible through a microscope, there are other ways in which the quality of gametes and 
embryos is assessed by patients, clinicians and geneticists. The first has a long history, namely 
appraising the person from which gametes originate. For example, the practice of sourcing ‘quality’ 
Ivy League eggs from university campuses in America for large sums when a donor is needed is 
well known and has raised a number of ethical questions about inducement and risks associated 
with egg donation. Moreover, sperm banks such as Cryos in Denmark are clear about their sources 
and screening practices: “The donors are ordinary, physically and mentally healthy men from a 
broad cross section of society. Most of them are students from institutions of higher education. Each 
donor candidate meets rigorous selection criteria and undergoes a thorough examination prior to 
acceptance” [18]. Couples searching for donors are provided with an extended, 8-page donor profile 
which includes detailed information about the donor’s physique, health, education level, hobbies, 
personality, family medical history as well as a sample of handwriting. So the ‘quality’ of a gamete 
or embryo also concerns what is considered its innate heredity. 
 
In the social screening of gamete donors, it is assumed/hoped that the gamete’s innate qualities will 
be transmitted to the future offspring. However, as we saw earlier, when it comes to serious 
hereditary disease, neither morphological assessment nor social screening can tell you anything 
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about the genetic status of a particular gamete, embryo or foetus. For this, genetic diagnosis 
techniques based on DNA analysis are used to identify genetically ‘tainted’ carriers, embryos or 
foetuses as a way of selectively preventing transmission of a particular hereditary biological quality. 
That is to say, further to its morphology and social origin, the quality of a gamete or embryo is also 
assessed by its genetics. 
 
And so, biological quality can be morphologically (scoring scales for sperm, oocyte or embryo 
quality), socially (social screening of potential gamete donors) and genetically (using PGD or 
prenatal diagnosis techniques) assessed, with the assumption being that the assessed ‘quality’ is 
inherent to the biological sample itself. Now, it is crucial to point out differences in how selective 
decisions are made about which embryos to implant and/or which pregnancies to terminate. 
Morphological quality estimations are used by doctors to decide which gametes to use or which 
embryos to implant as a way of maximising a couples’ chances for a successful pregnancy and 
birth. Social and genetic assessments of donors, embryos or foetuses are made by doctors and then 
communicated to prospective parents who must ultimately make an informed choice about which 
donor or embryo they wish to use/have implanted, or about whether or not to terminate a pregnancy.  
 
There is, then, a clear distinction between selection to improve chances of successful reproduction 
and selection to promote or prevent the transmission of certain biological qualities to future 
offspring. It is this latter form of selection that is considered ethically problematic, for where does 
one ‘draw the line’? One of the ‘slippery slopes’ reproductive medicine is seen to be balancing on 
concerns so-called ‘designer babies’ and what genetic traits it is ethically appropriate to prevent or 
allow being transmitted in individual cases [9]. Moreover, there is also debate about the ‘widening 
scope’ of PGD and prenatal diagnosis criteria to include so-called ‘late onset’ and ‘lower 
penetrance’ conditions [11]. The important point to make is that while assessment of the biological 
quality of gametes, embryos and foetuses will provide doctors and patients with information about 
the chances of transmitting certain hereditary traits, it does not tell them anything about which of 
these hereditary traits is ‘good’ or ‘bad’. This normative assessment relies again on notions of what 
a ‘good life’ or a ‘life worth living’ is, as discussed above. 
 
Selection and the eugenic legacy 
 
The question of selection in reproductive medicine is without doubt the most ethically charged. 
Whether selection occurs prior to implantation following embryo biopsies or through the voluntary 
termination of a pregnancy following prenatal diagnosis, there has been comprehensive ethical 
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debate about, firstly, whether any kind of selection is ethically sound and, secondly, if some kinds 
of selection are acceptable, which kinds are not? To understand these debates it is necessary to look 
to the history of the concept of ‘selection’ itself in the context of human reproduction. Charles 
Darwin’s famous hypothesis of an evolution driven by chance mutations and natural selection 
played a pivotal role in 19th century theorising about the mechanisms of human progress. Having 
initially derived his law of natural selection from observations of animal species, in Descent of Man 
Darwin applied his schematic to humankind, only to suggest that natural selection ran into a 
problem in the so-called civilised countries: 
 
“With savages, the weak in body or mind are soon eliminated; and those that survive commonly 
exhibit a vigorous state of health. We civilised men, on the other hand, do our utmost to check the 
process of elimination; we build asylums for the imbecile, the maimed, and the sick; we institute 
poor-laws; and our medical men exert their utmost skill to save the life of every one to the last 
moment… Thus the weak members of civilised societies propagate their kind... It is surprising how 
soon a want of care, or care wrongly directed, leads to the degeneration of a domestic race.” [19] 
 
This, of course, was the central problem for 19th and 20th century eugenicists: how to stop the 
degeneration of the ‘stock’ or ‘quality’ of the national race. If natural selection was being thwarted 
by human intervention, eugenicists argued, then it was up to those in authority to steer this selection 
through reproductive policies. In both Europe and America, encouraging marriage amongst people 
of ‘good stock’, controlled immigration, forced sterilisation of people of ‘bad stock’ and ultimately 
the catastrophic atrocities of the Nazi regime in the 20th century were all sold as attempts to direct 
selection in order to improve the ‘quality’ of national populations. Such policies and programmes 
have since been both condemned and abandoned, but their legacy continues to inform contemporary 
ethical debates concerning interventions into human reproduction. 
 
For this reason, those who advocate selection of embryos or termination of pregnancies (the latter 
being far more common) following genetic diagnoses today, do so by stressing that such selection 
must only take place when a couple has given their explicit, informed consent. It must be a matter 
of choice and it must not be a decision made by anyone else, least so by those in positions of 
authority, whether they are a doctor, nurse or politician. Consequently practitioners working with 
reproductive medicine are bound by strict ethical codes of conduct which stipulate ‘non-directive’ 
assistance to couples [20]. 
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Nevertheless, a crucial part of the bioethical debate on selection today concerns whether or not this 
is a form of ‘backdoor eugenics’ [1]. As put by Kerr and Shakespeare: “The focus may have shifted 
to abortion rather than sterilization or euthanasia, and to disease rather than social deviancy, but 
there are fine lines between these approaches” [5]. Also here, reproductive medicine is seen as 
balancing on a ‘slippery slope’ where the fear is that despite stipulations of non-directive assistance 
it is nonetheless the interests of the collective that pressure couples into reproductive decisions [21]. 
In these debates, public consultations, strict national regulations on how reproductive technologies 
should be used as well as improved ethical codes and informed consent procedures are called for in 
attempts to ensure that contemporary society steers clear of its eugenic past. 
 
We can see, then, how bioethical deliberations over whether reproductive selection today amounts 
to eugenics invoke ‘quality’ or ‘stock’ as regards an aggregated collective – ‘population’, ‘society’ 
or ‘human gene pool’. It is feared that persons in positions of authority are making misguided 
judgements about reproductive selection not so much for the sake of a better quality of life for 
future parents or offspring, but rather for the sake of a ‘better society’ that would be ‘rid’ of certain 
debilitating diseases and thereby less ‘burdened’ (whether this burden is seen as genetic or socio-
economic). ‘Population quality’, then, is a biological form of quality, but one that refers not to an 
individual or her/his gametes, but rather to the collective biology of a given (usually national) 
population. Bioethical critiques that see the new reproductive genetics as nothing more than 
eugenics suggest that selection resulting from genetic testing and counselling is in fact dangerously 
serving the interests of this collective, at the cost of some of the most vulnerable persons in today’s 
society. 
 
Conclusions: life and living 
 
In this article, I have shown how different notions of ‘quality’ inform and organise practices of 
selection in reproductive medicine as well as the ethical debates that surround them. Grading 
gamete and embryo quality, assessing the likely degree of impact on quality of life associated with a 
particular condition and invoking past atrocities which aimed to improve population quality all 
speak to a common, yet diverse, will to gauge, ensure, protect and/or improve individual or 
collective vitality, i.e. to optimise life. Yet these different forms of quality do not necessarily 
intersect very neatly: a bad quality sperm or embryo can result in a healthy child; a good quality 
embryo can be genetically ‘tainted’; sufferers of certain genetically transmitted diseases which have 
been licensed for PGD or PND may not consider their quality of life as low. Yet they are not 
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contradictions, rather they show how there are different concepts of quality used in assessments of 
what good life is. 
 
This is where bioethical deliberation in reproductive medicine comes in: What criteria should be 
used to decide what a good quality of life is, or what a life worth living is? What biological qualities 
is it ethically justified to deliberately prevent or allow transmission of using assisted reproductive 
technologies? Does the collective (society, national population, human gene pool) have any 
interests that reproductive technologies should take into account? 
 
In recent years, such bioethical deliberation has become increasingly institutionalised such that it is 
possible to distinguish between, on the one hand, national ethics commissions, public consultations, 
regulatory bodies and legislation which aim at capturing some kind of a ‘national public view’ on 
how new biotechnologies should be used in an ethically acceptable manner, and on the other, 
informed consent procedures, ethical review boards and codes of conduct which aim to protect 
vulnerable individuals. The former interpellate the collective – a public in need of stewardship – 
and they are put in place as safeguards against the ‘slippery slope’ that science is often times seen to 
be balancing on. The latter interpellate the citizen – an individual with rights that need to be 
protected – and they are put in place as safeguards against the potential coercion or exploitation of 
vulnerable individuals. 
 
Yet, the introduction of such procedures and regulations have of course not resolved all bioethical 
concerns. In the field of reproductive medicine, as we saw, some argue that such safeguards have 
not prevented a dangerous form of ‘backdoor eugenics’ from flourishing and neither have they 
prevented couples from being coerced into terminating pregnancies following genetic diagnosis. 
Others dismiss the suggestion that reproductive medicine might eventually do away with disease 
and suffering as dystopian hype, far removed from the realities of an imprecise and ‘messy’ science. 
 
At the same time, however, as we have also seen, it is not just hype and fear that surround 
reproductive medicine today. It is also a field saturated with hope. Hope for a better life for future 
offspring, families and ultimately society. What I have suggested in this paper is that the co-
circulation of these hopes, hypes and fears are not necessarily contradictory – e.g. one can easily 
hope for the best possible life for one’s future child, while fearing the coercion implicated in forms 
of reproductive counselling that emphasise the collective. One way to see how they emerge in 
cohort is to look at the concepts that organise the debates, and I have shown how different concepts 
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of ‘quality’ and the forms of normative assessment that they enable, have done this. What must be 
kept clear in these debates are the conditions under which normativities of ‘good life’ are stabilised. 
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